




While more and more nuclear installations facing the end of their lifetime, 
decommissioning financing issues gain importance in political discussions. 
The financing needs are huge along the Uranium value chain. Following the 
polluter pays principle the operator of a nuclear installation is expected to 
accumulate all the necessary decommissioning funds during the operating 
life of its facility. However, since decommissioning experience is still limited, 
since the decommissioning process can take several decades and since the time 
period between the shutdown of a nuclear installation and the final disposal 
of radioactive waste can be very long, there are substantial risks that costs will 
be underestimated and that the liable party and the funds accumulated might 
not be available anymore when decommissioning activities have to be paid. 
Nevertheless, these financing risks can be reduced by the implementation of 
transparent, restricted, well-governed decommissioning financing schemes, 
with a system of checks and balances that aims at avoiding negative effects 
stemming from conflicts of interests.
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1 Introduction
By the end of 2017, 166 nuclear power reactors had been permanently shut down, of 
which 144 were in the process of dismantling or had already been fully demolished 
(IAEA 2018). Moreover, 64% of the operational nuclear power reactors in the world 
at this time were 30 years old or older, and are thus candidates for being shut down 
in the near future (cf. Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Number of operational nuclear power reactors by age (as of 31 Dec. 2017) 
(Based on IAEA, 2018, 78)
This will result into the need to dismantle, decontaminate and demolish these 
nuclear facilities as well as to undertake processing, conditioning and disposal 
of nuclear waste and spent fuel (‘decommissioning’)(Irrek et al., 2007). It is of 
paramount importance that the funding of these decommissioning activities will 
be adequate and available when needed in order to avoid negatively affecting the 
safety of citizens and natural environment. Although this has been principally 
known since early days of NPP operation (cf., e. g., Lukes et al., 1978), the political 
pressure to identify and implement respective solutions has only increased within 
recent years due to changes in the electricity markets in the course of liberalisation 
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and transformation towards a sustainable energy system and the respective impacts 
on the economic situation of NPP operators and their mother companies, and due 
to more and more NPPs facing their end of operation.
In general, decommissioning financing needs are huge along the Uranium value 
chain. Underground uranium mines and mills, open pits, uranium and thorium 
processing, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear reactors, 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, interim storages and further nuclear installations 
have to be decommissioned in a way that human beings, flora and fauna, air, soil, 
open and ground water sources will be protected against radiation exposure and 
radioactive contamination. Decommissioning and rehabilitation of the nuclear sites 
represents a challenge in ecological and economic terms for the former operators. 
The amount of radioactive waste from all steps of the Uranium value chain adds 
to the complexity of task (Hagen et al., 2005).
Operators of nuclear installations are expected to accumulate all the necessary 
decommissioning funds during the operating life of facilities. However:
• The decommissioning process can take several decades;
• In particular, the time period between the shutdown of a nuclear installation 
and the final disposal of radioactive waste can be very long;
• Therefore, the liable party and the funds accumulated might not be available 
anymore when decommissioning activities have to be paid;
• Moreover, expected decommissioning costs are only partly assessable since 
nuclear decommissioning experience is still limited, and technical concepts 
for important decommissioning steps, particularly for final disposal of higher 
activity waste (HAW), often do not yet exist;
• Finally, unexpected radiation and contamination problems might lead to addi-
tional financing needs even after decades, hundreds or thousands of years after 
final disposal of radioactive waste.
Therefore, this chapter will analyse
• to which extent the Polluter Pays Principle can be implemented in order to 
ensure the complete financing of a safe decommissioning by the operators of 
nuclear installations;
• the different decommissioning financing steps needed;
• who will benefit from the amounts of finance accumulated;
• and compare selected decommissioning financing concepts realised in different 
countries.
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Based on this analysis, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations given for 
the design of safe decommissioning financing concepts. The chapter will thereby 
focus on decommissioning financing of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP). 
However, the general findings can also be transferred to other private or public-
ly-owned nuclear installations.
2 Basic liability principles
Nuclear liabilities of a NPP operator include liabilities for the dismantling, de-
contamination, demolition and site clearance of the nuclear facilities at the end 
of their lifetime as well as for the storage, processing, conditioning and disposal 
of nuclear waste and spent fuel. They arise with the start of operation of a nuclear 
facility, i. e. as the first activation or contamination takes place, and usually increase 
with operation.
A main principle with regard to the distribution of liabilities is the ‘Polluter Pays 
Principle’. In general, the Polluter Pays Principle is broadly accepted in environ-
mental and economic policy. In theory, in a world of perfect information, perfect 
competition and full rationality of market actors, allocative efficiency will be gained 
if all external costs are internalised into the market. In order to maximise the net 
benefit to the society, in principle, the NPP operators should be fully responsible for 
covering the full costs of decommissioning a NPP. This requires a clearly defined 
obligation to plan, implement and finance all decommissioning activities including 
nuclear waste management and final disposal operations. Since the NPP operator 
does not earn money with the NPP after its shutdown, all necessary financial 
means have to be collected during operation of the plant via the electricity prices 
to cover associated decommissioning costs. If decommissioning is not paid by 
those who have benefited from its operation inter- and intra-generational justice 
will not be ensured.
However, in contrast to theory, the Polluter Pays Principle is not fully imple-
mented in every country. In some countries like Finland and Sweden, the ‘Pol-
luter Pays Principle’ is a legal requirement, and there has been made substantial 
progress during the last ten years in several European countries with respect to 
better ensuring its implementation (Irrek et al., 2007; European Commission 2013; 
European Commission 2013a). But still in several countries, the liability of NPP 
operators ends with transfer of radioactive waste to a state-governed organisation. 
According to international law, the state has the responsibility for final disposal 
of radioactive waste. Therefore, financial liabilities for final disposal (and partly 
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waste management, too) are not always fully with the ‘polluters’ but in some cases 
at least partly transferred to the state. For example (Irrek et al., 2007; European 
Commission 2013; European Commission 2013a):
• In Slovenia, the fees the operator pays for dealing with radioactive waste include 
the cost of final disposal. They discharge the operator from any waste manage-
ment and disposal liability. However, the levy is periodically reassessed based 
on available technical data and other inputs.
• In the case of Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovak Republic, there are agreements 
between the state governments, the European Union and some Member States 
about European contributions to finance decommissioning of the nuclear power 
plants in the context of the countries’ accession to the European Union in order 
to ease an early shutdown of these NPPs for safety reasons (cf. Schmidt et al. 
,2013, and Ustohalova/Schmidt, 2014, for recent discussion on this support and 
its effectiveness). 
• In Germany, in mid 2017, NPP operators transferred all liabilities for interim 
storage and final disposal of radioactive materials to the state against a lump 
sum of Euro 24.1 bn, with financing regarding these activities managed by a 
state-governed fund. Any costs exceeding this amount will not have to be borne 
by the NPP operators. This severely violates the Polluter Pays Principle. The 
argument behind this was fed by a substantial decrease in electricity wholesale 
prices which has caused severe losses of the large energy companies. It was 
argued that it would be better to secure a lump sum paid by the NPP operators 
now instead of not knowing if the companies will be able to finance radioac-
tive waste management activities in the future. It should be noted that the cost 
estimate behind this amount is just a rough one, partly based on an extremely 
rough estimate of 1997 by a German authority (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz 
– BfS) for a final disposal site which is not a technically feasible one (Gorleben). 
Moreover, it does not take into account various problems with interim storages 
which have already been foreseen by nuclear experts (cf., e. g., Neumann, 2016). 
In parallel to the transfer of liabilities and money in 2017, the state took over two 
central interim storages. From 2019 onwards, the state will also be responsible 
for the decentral interim storages at the NPP sites, which have been in operation 
by the NPP operators. From 2020 onwards, the German state will be responsible 
for all interim storage sites as well as for any final disposal activities.
Even in those countries, in which the Polluter Pays Principle is a legal requirement, 
a NPP operator will not be made financially liable for 
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• any radiation exposure and radioactive contamination in the Uranium value 
chain before the fuel arrives at the NPP. While it theory, for this part of the 
nuclear fuel chain, the respective owners of the Uranium mill or the Uranium 
processing, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants should be made 
financially liable, ethical considerations could lead to the argument, that the 
NPP operator has to bear some social responsibility also for these parts of the 
value chain.
• any problems arising after the final closure of the final disposal facility. The re-
sponsibility usually ends as soon as all waste has been finally disposed of and the 
safety authorities have accepted that the final closure of the final disposal facility 
has been concluded fulfilling the pertinent safety requirements for final closure. 
However, the example of the German Asse II mine shows that unforeseen problems 
can arise after closure of such a final disposal. From 1967 to 1978, 125,787 drums 
and waste packages containing low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste 
were emplaced in this test repository. The legal basis for this was mining law, not 
nuclear law, and there was no proof of long-term safety before the waste was disposed. 
Today, the large total volume of open drifts and chambers and the closeness of the 
chambers to the adjoining rock cause severe problems in the Asse mine. The salt 
rock and adjoining rock loosen, and clefts have formed through which groundwater 
flows into the mine. The severeness of this disposal problem has been increased by 
the fact that the inventory of radioactive waste in this mine is not exactly known, 
particularly with regard to the amount of plutonium disposed. It is now planned 
to retrieve the radioactive waste and to dispose it elsewhere (www.asse.bund.de; 
status: 08 May 2016). The fees collected for the final disposal of radioactive waste 
during operation of the mine summed up to about Euro 8.25m, while current 
estimates for retrieval costs are between Euro 4–6bn (Kirbach 2009; N.N. 2013; 
www.atommuellreport.de; status: 08 May 2016). There has been some discussion 
in Germany on who should be made financially liable for these extra costs. In 2010, 
some German politicians (e.g., Kelber et al., 2010) argued that the introduction 
of the nuclear fuel tax could be justified, among others, by the fact that the NPP 
operators have benefited from disposal sites like Asse II and thus should contribute 
to the additional costs that will occur.
Anyway, if such problems arise decades or hundreds of years after the closure of 
the final disposal facility, the NPP operators might not exist anymore. This could 
also happen if problems arise during the final disposal activities decades after the 
NPP shutdown. Therefore, full implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle cannot 
be 100% secured in any decommissioning financing scheme. Nevertheless, it should 
become a legal requirement and should be implemented as far as possible in every 
Financing Nuclear Decommissioning 145
145
country with nuclear facilities in order to increase allocative efficiency. Nevertheless, 
the implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle will only function well if there 
is a sufficient amount of transparency to the public in the interest of current and 
future generations of electricity customers and taxpayers. Therefore a requirement 
to ensure transparency should be added, which should include transparency of the 
following steps of decommissioning financing (Irrek et al., 2007):
• Determination of decommissioning strategies and time schedules;
• Identification and estimation of decommissioning costs including cost break-
downs by cost items and details of cost estimation methodology, 
• Collection of decommissioning funds; 
• Management and investment of funds until the money is used for payment of 
decommissioning activities;
• Use of funds for the original purpose, i. e. for payment of decommissioning 
activities. 
These steps are analysed in more detail in the following chapters.
3 Technical decommissioning strategies and  
time schedules
In principle, there are three technical decommissioning (decontamination and 
dismantling) strategies for NPPs (Irrek et al., 2007; OECD/NEA, 2012; OECD/
NEA, 2016):
• Immediate dismantling:  
Decontamination and dismantling immediately after operation period. All 
contaminated material is removed or decontaminated to a level at which no 
more regulatory control is required. In this case, dismantling starts shortly 
after the permanent shutdown of the NPP and might take between 15–20 years, 
with no unforeseen incidents happening. In case of unavailability of routes for 
the spent nuclear fuel, this is kept in an interim storage on-site, which might be 
decommissioned decades after the demolition of the NPP has been completed.
• Deferred dismantling (safe enclosure / safe storage):  
First, spent fuel is removed from the facility. The plant is then kept intact and in 
a safe and stable state to enable the radionuclides activity to decay until it reaches 
levels that reduce difficulties of handling. Decontamination and dismantling 
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then starts several decades after the permanent shutdown of the NPP. Deferral 
periods range between 20 and around 100 years, e. g. 25 years in Spain, 60 years 
in the United States, and a century or more in the United Kingdom.
• Entombment  
This option involves encasing radioactive structures, systems and components in 
a long-lived substance, such as concrete. The encased plant would be appropriately 
maintained, and surveillance would continue until the radioactivity decays to 
a level that permits termination of the plant’s license and end any regulatory 
control. Most nuclear plants will have radionuclide concentrations exceeding 
the limits for unrestricted use even after 100 years. Therefore, special provisions 
would be needed for the extended monitoring period this option requires. To 
date, no facility owners have proposed the entombment option for any nuclear 
power plants undergoing decommissioning. In fact, this is more an emergency 
option than a strategy option, so far used only in the case of Chernobyl. 
The choice of strategy depends on several parameters and framework conditions, 
the decontamination, dismantling and demolition stage aimed at, and the plan-
ning for the future use of the site. Operators of nuclear facilities usually take into 
account the following criteria when deciding on a dismantling strategy (Irrek et 
al., 2007; OECD/NEA 2016, 46):
• Radiation protection  
There is one major argument for deferred dismantling which is radioactivity 
decay, as it will ensure the reduction of radiation hazard during dismantling 
and a reduction of volume of radioactive waste. Moreover, new techniques 
(e. g., robotics) might be invented that could further reduce radiation harzards. 
Finally, deferred dismantling might ease disposal routes for radioactive waste if 
a final disposal site is available by this time. On the other hand, with immediate 
dismantling, radiological characterisation is much easier and less costly. More-
over, there will be reduced effects of deterioration and ageing like corrosion.
• Know-how of employees  
Immediate dismantling ensures the availability of qualified and experienced 
workforce with internal knowledge on the design and history of the facility 
from its operation. On the one hand, immediate dismantling might ease a 
socially acceptable reduction in employed and contracted staff at the site of 
the nuclear facility after the installation has been shut down (cf. Irrek, 2005). 
On the other hand, workers might not be motivated to demolish a plant where 
they had been working. Moreover, deferred decontamination and dismantling 
might make it easier to outsource dismantling activities at cheap labour costs 
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because of existing wage differentials between employees in the nuclear sector 
and employees of contractors.
• Reuse of site  
Immediate dismantling allows an earlier reuse of the site, with respective eco-
nomic effects for the region.
• Costs  
A thorough evaluation and comparison of different strategies is needed in order 
to assess which strategy will be the least-cost while fulfilling all the nuclear safety 
obligations. For example, for the deferred decontamination and dismantling 
strategy, it has to be taken into account in how far existing ancillary equipment 
can be used for decommissioning activities decades after the end of operation 
as well as the costs for maintenance and surveillance. Moreover, economies of 
scale could be achieved if several similar plants are dismantled in co-ordinated 
manner. A general question is how much cheaper is it to outsource decontam-
ination and dismantling activities or to carry them out in-house with existing 
know-how. Furthermore, total costs also depend on the availability of waste 
management, storage and disposal options, and on the decision about the use 
of the site for other purposes after its release from radiological restrictions. 
However, such cost estimation is not an easy task. Different assumptions on 
the underlying decontamination and dismantling processes, on the technical 
feasibility of possible technical solutions and technical developments, on per-
son-years needed, on labour, material/equipment and capital costs, on time 
horizons, and on developments of the labour market and the general economic 
environment can lead to different strategic choices.
• Financial risks  
Risks and uncertainties of changes in benefits and costs have to be adequately 
taken into account because of all these possible influences, time horizons of 
several decades are considered. For example, a long period of deferment not only 
gives the chance to yield interest over a longer period of time, but includes also 
a higher risk that the funds will be lost or will significantly lose value.
The preferred decommissioning strategy can differ from case to case, even within the 
same country. In most cases, economic arguments with respect to expected financial 
benefits and costs as well as perceived financial risks are the decisive arguments 
for the operators to choose a specific decommissioning strategy, particularly for 
privately owned facilities. However, there are also strategic or tactical arguments 
for particular decommissioning strategies of the NPP operators in the course of 
political discussions on the distribution of liabilities (cf., e. g., discussion in Germany 
on the possible final repository site). Nuclear safety authorities are mostly in favour 
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of immediate dismantling, particularly in recent years in the European Union. The 
reasons given for this include the consideration that the risk of the loss of memory 
on the conception and operation of a facility will be significant.
4 Identification and estimation of decommissioning 
costs
Based on the decommissioning strategy and time schedule determined, cost plan-
ning starts with an identification and estimation of costs. The direct comparison 
of decommissioning cost estimates generated for different plants by different cost 
estimate providers is limited due to different cost structures, different combina-
tions of individual cost items, different methodologies applied and different ways 
of dealing with uncertainties. This holds true, even if the results are presented in 
a similar manner, e. g., by using the International Structure for Decommissioning 
Costing (ISDC). Following the ISDC, costs can be split up for principal activities 
as follows (OECD/NEA, 2012):
01 – Pre-decommissioning actions.
02 – Facility shutdown activities.
03 – Additional activities for safe enclosure and entombment.
04 – Dismantling activities within the controlled area.
05 – Waste processing, storage and disposal.
06 – Site infrastructure and operation.
07 – Conventional dismantling, demolition and site restoration.
08 – Project management, engineering and support.
09 – Research and development.
10 – Fuel and nuclear material.
11 – Miscellaneous expenditures.
For each of these principal activities, on a second level, several activity groups can 
be distinguished. For example, according to ISDC (OECD/NEA 2012), pre-decom-
missioning actions consist of decommissioning planning, facility characterisation, 
waste management planning and further activity groups, each differentiated on 
a third level into single activities (e. g., strategic planning, preliminary planning 
and final decommissioning planning). For each activity, labour costs, investment 
costs (capital, equipment, material costs), expenses (consumables, taxes, etc.) and 
Financing Nuclear Decommissioning 149
149
contingencies (a specific provision for unforeseeable elements of costs within the 
defined projects scope) should be identified.
In many cases, cost estimates are bottom-up ones taken into account the spe-
cific decommissioning activities required. However, there are also cost estimates 
by specific analogy to similar past projects, by parametric estimating based on 
historical databases on similar systems and subsystems, by cost reviews that just 
look at those cost items to be updated or by rough expert opinion when other 
techniques or data are not available (OECD/NEA, 2015). As with other complex 
construction or deconstruction or other engineering projects, cost estimates are 
based on a number of technical and economic assumptions, and on assumptions 
influenced by the political-administrative framework conditions. Therefore, there 
are financial risks to be taken into account in any ex ante-evaluation of decom-
missioning project costs. In practice, there are different methodologies how to take 
into account uncertainties and risks, for example (Irrek et al., 2007; Däuper et al., 
2014; OECD/NEA, 2016):
• Risks and uncertainties ignored  
In Switzerland, in 2014, the Swiss Federal Audit Office claimed that cost es-
timates were based on an ideal scenario leading to too low contributions to 
the decommissioning funds and a high degree of risk borne by the Federal 
Government. However, in the future, following a new ordinance implemented 
in 2014, a 30% contingency for unexpected costs should be included according 
to a new ordinance.
• Conservative estimates  
In France, national regulation demands dismantling cost estimates to be ‘con-
servative’ ones;
• Cost estimates with flat or specific contingency factors  
In the Slovak Republic, based on risk analysis and risk assessment, contingency 
factors between 0.2 and 16.5% are considered;
• Scenario calculation with sensitivity analysis of major cost drivers  
In Lithuania, scenario calculations take into account different wage levels;
• Probabilistic and deterministic cost estimates  
In Sweden, probabilistic cost estimates performed in Sweden in addition to 
deterministic ones;
• Complex modeling  
Monte Carlo analysis and other quantitative modeling approaches can be used 
to simulate possible deviations from assumptions taken, if there are many 
independent variables with significant uncertainties. In the United Kingdom 
a combination of computational modeling with Monte Carlo simulation and 
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management judgement based on experience of previous projects leads to con-
tingencies in the range between 1–24%.
In general, optimism bias can cause a NPP operator to believe that the respective 
NPP is less at risk of experiencing a future cost increase compared to others. There-
fore, regulation has to ensure that adequate cost estimation methodologies are 
applied that properly take into account possible risks of cost increases. Moreover, 
international organisations and national authorities should ensure that information 
on costs of past decommissioning activities are widely spread and could be used 
for calculation of future costs. Information on past decommissioning activities 
and improved methodologies have led to substantial increases in cost estimates in 
various countries during the past 15 years (cf. OECD/NEA, 2016).
5 Collection of decommissioning funds 
After the costs have been properly estimated, it has to be determined, if, when and 
how funds should be set aside at the beginning of and/or during plant operation. 
In general, any financing scheme should ensure and be managed and periodically 
reviewed in a way that sufficient funds will be collected during the lifetime of a 
nuclear facility and will be available at the time decommissioning and waste man-
agement expenses occur. Basically, the funding schemes can be differentiated into 
(cf. also Irrek et al., 2007; OECD/NEA, 2016):
• Payment of decommissioning activities from the current budget of public au-
thorities (e. g., for decommissioning of Uranium mines in Germany): Provisions 
might be collected during lifetime of a plant via a levy or taxes, but very often 
there is no collection of funds during lifetime of the plant.
• Internal unrestricted fund of a private company (e. g., for dismantling and 
demolition and waste processing of NPPs in Germany): On the liabilities side 
of the balance sheet, the liable company discloses the amount of provisions ac-
cumulated by the respective year. However, it is not required that any assets are 
separated and reserved or earmarked for decommissioning purposes. Therefore, 
if decommissioning activities have to be paid it might happen that there will 
not be any financial means available. In case of insolvency of the company, the 
state has to step into the breach.
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• Internal restricted fund of a private liable company with public regulation (e. 
g., for NPPs in France): In contrast to the internal unrestricted fund, there is an 
enhanced insolvency protection because assets are separated and earmarked for 
decommissioning purposes and restrictions on investment of funds are imposed.
• External restricted fund (in most of the European countries, e. g., in Switzerland, 
Finland and Sweden): The funds are managed externally, i. e. not within the 
liable company, but by a dedicated body that may be a private or state-owned 
entity, and with respective transparency. This dedicated body has to follow 
specific restrictions with regard to the investment of financial means in order 
to enhance insolvency protection. In most cases, although there is an external 
fund installed the liabilities remain with the NPP operators. Thus the Polluter 
Pays Principle will be followed. For example, if there is an increase in costs, NPP 
operators will have to make additional payments to the funds. However, this is 
not the case with the new external fund for radioactive waste management and 
final disposal installed in Germany recently, where NPP operators have just 
paid a lump sum to the fund.
• External unrestricted fund (e. g., the ‘Cassia conjugation per ill set tore electric 
– CCSE’ in Italy, which allows surcharges on the electricity price for several 
purposes, among others, for nuclear decommissioning).
Accruals to an internal fund or contributions to an external fund are usually set 
up in regular installments or according to the electrical energy produced. For this, 
costs are usually inflated up to the year they will incur, and then discounted to 
its current value to determine the size of the accrual. Since discounting rates are 
usually higher than inflation rates, this leads to the sum of accruals or contributions 
being lower than the cost estimates. This, in turn, demands to yearly provide funds 
not only for the regular installment, but also for the difference between the present 
values of the actual year and the past year. The determination of the inflation and 
discounting rates is of central importance in any of these funding regimes. Only 
in few countries, provisions are based on undiscounted costs.
However, there are also funding regimes, where the full amount of costs has 
to be provided for from start of operation (Irrek et al., 2007; Däuper et al., 2014; 
OECD/NEA, 2016): For example, in France, since 2006, with a transition period 
until 2010, provisions for dismantling and decontamination of a NPP have to be fully 
collected already with start of operation. In Finland, a special requirement exists 
which, in principle, demands to cover the full nuclear liability already at the start 
of operation by special financial securities. In Sweden and in the Netherlands, with 
start of operation, NPP operators have to provide a guarantee for early shutdown. 
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Fig. 2 Guarantees covering fi nancial risks related to decommissioning costs occurring 
in case of early shutdown (Guarantee I) or aft er fi nal shutdown of the plant 
(Guarantee II) (Irrek et al., 2007, 152)
Such schemes substantially reduce the risk that the state will have to pay for early 
shutdown of plants and contribute to implementing the Polluter Pays Principle. In 
addition to such guarantees for early shut down (Guarantee I in Fig. 2), in some fi -
nancing schemes, NPP operators have to provide additional guarantees for additional 
costs exceeding the cost estimates that might occur aft er fi nal shutdown (Guarantee 
II in Fig. 2). For example, in Finland, the state has the possibility to demand such 
guarantees up to 10% of the sum of liabilities. In Sweden, such guarantees amount 
to 16–17% of estimated costs. And in Switzerland, there partly is a joint liability of 
all operators in case one of the NPP operators cannot pay its contributions.
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6 Management and investment of funds
A well-designed governance regime of the fund and a high level of quality of fund 
management is crucial for maintaining or even increasing the value of the funds so 
that sufficient funds will be available at the time decommissioning activities have 
to be paid. Funds can be managed by public or private fund managers. Specific 
restrictions beyond general accounting principles and general accounting law can 
be imposed on managers of internal or external funds, e. g., with regard to (Irrek 
et al., 2007):
• the way funds have to be accumulated;
• the investment of the financial means collected until they are used to pay for 
decommissioning activities;
• the payment for decommissioning costs;
• the regular reporting on funds and fund management;
• the control by the public (e.g., government, parliament, special boards, infor-
mation rights of the public).
Typical examples of investment restrictions and guarantees required for internal 
or external funds in practice are (Irrek et al., 2007; Däuper et al., 2014; OECD/
NEA, 2016):
• Restrictions regarding the degree of risk allowed to be taken, e. g. by limiting 
the share of asset classes with higher risks. For example, in France, assets of 
the internal restricted funds have to present a sufficient degree of security and 
liquidity. However, since 2010, diversification into real assets has been increased. 
In Slovenia, it has to be invested not less than 30% in state bonds, not more than 
5% in stock, not more than 15% in other bonds, not more than 5% in stocks of 
one issuer, and approximately 10% in securities on foreign financial markets. 
In the US, there are just simple guidelines such as using a “prudent investor” 
standard, with restrictions on self-investing and on foreign investment.
• Restrictions that do not allow investment in companies associated with the 
legally obliged parties or that have invested the majority of their assets in nu-
clear facilities.
• In Finland, there is the special situation that the lincensee can borrow back up 
to 75% of the capital of the fund against securities and at current interest rates.
Actual performance of the funds differs depending on the investment restrictions 
imposed, i. e. on the degree of risk taken, and on the general economic situation. 
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Tab. 1 Yield on investment of the Swiss decommissioning and waste management 
funds (quarterly reports) 
Nominal Yield on 
Investment per 
Quarter
Real Yield on 
Investment per 
Year
Nominal Yield on 
Investment per 
Quarter















































Bonds (Other Currencies; hedged)
Quarter



















** not including KKM
* Since 1 April  2017, there is a separated investment strategy for the NPP Mühleberg (KKM) compared to the 
investment strategy for the NPPs Beznau (KKB), Gösgen (KKG), Leibstadt (KKL) and for the interim storage 
Würenlingen AG (Zwilag); therefore the first number is relevant for KKM, the second fo KKB, KKG, KKL, Zwilag. 
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While the European Commission (2013a) recommends that a secure risk profile 
should be sought in the investment of the assets, ensuring that a positive return is 
achieved, a 100% security of a positive return over any given period of time cannot 
be guaranteed over the many decades of lifetime of such a fund. Moreover, there is 
a general tradeoff between security and the yield on investment.
The Swiss example in Table 1 shows that an investment strategy with up to 50% 
of funds invested into shares at the stock market can lead to comparatively high 
returns in some quarters of a year, but also to a decrease in funds value in others. 
If the liable company feeds the fund with discounted contributions, the fund will 
have to yield positive returns to make up for the difference between the cost estimate 
and the discounted value, or additional contributions by the liable company will 
be needed. This will be also required with a secure investment strategy, if there 
are negative real interest rates on safe investment into bonds of solvent states as it 
could be observed in some states recently.
The internal unrestricted fund differs from the restricted solutions in one impor-
tant aspect: The provisions accumulated on the liabilities side of the balance sheet do 
not guarantee that there will be financial means available when decommissioning 
activities have to be paid. The cash flow from the financial equivalent of the set-aside 
provisions can be freely used by the companies as a portion of corporate revenue. 
In Europe, Germany is the only country where such an internal, completely 
unrestricted fund still exists for the dismantling and demolition of reactors and 
for the conditioning of radioactive waste. Here, no information is available on how 
nuclear power plant operators or their parent groups have invested the unrestricted 
funds from the nuclear provisions. A direct link cannot be drawn between individual 
liability items and individual asset items on a group’s balance sheet. Just because 
provisions are set up does not necessarily mean that the funds are being invested to 
finance dismantling and disposal. Groups can employ any type of financing what-
soever to provide future funding for dismantling and disposal activities (cf., e. g., 
Perridon et al., 2012, for the general financing options). Using the German groups 
E.ON and RWE as examples, the financing options can be investigated as follows:
• With regard to financing from current cash flow, one needs to consider that 
operating margins have fallen sharply in recent years and have been negative 
at times, while revenue and EBITDA have also fallen year-over-year in most of 
E.ON’s and RWE’s business divisions. There is no guarantee that the cash flow 
generated during the next years will be adequate to finance higher provisions 
or pay for activities related to nuclear dismantling and the long-term storage 
of radioactive material.
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• The options that E.ON and RWE have for using debt to finance activities related 
to nuclear dismantling and disposal are becoming more limited in light of their 
declining credit ratings and relatively high debt-to-equity ratios.
• For financing through asset restructuring, one needs to take a closer look at the 
groups’ assets, especially tangible assets, shareholdings, financial assets and – to 
the extent that they are not required to cover current liabilities – liquid assets. 
Assets available in the short-term are not sufficient to cover net nuclear provi-
sions. The sum of the values of E.ON’s and RWE’s plant and machinery assets 
and shareholdings declined significantly from 2013 to 2016. There is a risk that 
this trend will continue.
While observing the availability of the groups’ current financial resources to cover 
their obligations in the nuclear sector, one must also bear in mind that the groups 
must use their assets and cash flow not only for their nuclear provisions, but also 
to cover other obligations. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the groups’ total 
financial resources with all of their assumed obligations. For example, for RWE, 
based on annual reports it can be calculated that the long-term financial resources 
at RWE’s disposal at the end of 2016 were hardly sufficient to cover all of RWE’s 
long-term obligations (own calculation based on annual company reports and 
Irrek / Vorfeld 2015). 
7 Use of nuclear decommissioning funds
In general, decommissioning funds should be used only for the purpose for which 
they have been established and managed, i. e. to pay for decommissioning and 
radioactive waste management activities. Therefore, the degree of independence 
between the operator of a nuclear installation as the liable polluter and contributor 
to the funds, the company carrying out decommissioning activities and thus using 
decommissioning funds, the funds management and the position disposing of the 
power of authorising payments is a key issue in any decommissioning financing 
system. 
In general, market actors in nuclear decommissioning business making use of 
nuclear decommissioning funds are the following:
• Operators of nuclear facilities, who benefit already during operation as well as 
after shut-down, depending on the degree they are involved in the decommis-
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sioning activities. During dismantling it is important to make use of existing 
know-how of the personnel of the NPP operator;
• National or international fi rms specialised in nuclear decommissioning;
• Local fi rms without any specialisation in nuclear decommissioning, e. g. craft s-
men, scaff olders, unqualifi ed staff  that can be trained for decontamination 
activities, etc.
Fig. 3 Past and expected future yearly payment for decommissioning activities in 
Germany, following groups’ balanced sheets and cost estimates by the NPP 
operators of 31 December 2014 including cost estimates for fi nal disposal of 
HAW although there is no technical concept or site available yet (balanced 
sheets of E.on, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall, 2003–2015; own calculation based 
on Warth & Klein Grant Th ornton, 2015)
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Tab. 2 Profits and losses of selected companies active in the German decommissioning 
market (companies’ income statements of 2014, 2015 and 2016 as far as 
available)
Company Year Profit / Loss 
[1,000 Euro]
Year Profit / Loss 
[1,000 Euro]
Nukem Technologies GmbH  
[Russian Rosatom group]
2014 -26,960 2015
Siempelkamp Ingenieur und Service 
GmbH [Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik 
GmbH]
2014 -2,683 2015 2,176
Celten Service GmbH 2015 105 2016 141
Eckert & Ziegler UmweltdiensteGmbH 2014 -1,367 2015 -4,266
SAT Kerntechnik GmbH 2014 32 2015
EWN Entsorgungswerk für  
Nuklearanlagen GmbH  
[Energiewerke Nord GmbH;  
German state-owned company]





Safetec Entsorgungs- und  
Sicherheitstechnik GmbH
2014 791 2015 793
EnBW Kernkraft GmbH [NPP operator] 2015 0 (per defini-
tion)
2016 0 (per defini-
tion)
Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy 
GmbH [NPP operator]
2014 -173,100 2015 -459,4000
GNS Gesellschaft  
für Nuklear-Service mbH
2015 27,400 2016 30,000
AREVA GmbH [incl. losses from NPP 
construction and modernisation]
2014 -764,164 2015 -632,392
In Germany, following the shutdown of NPPs after the Fukushima accident, decom-
missioning activities have increased during recent years (Fig. 3). It can be expected 
that the level of expenses will continue in the coming years when further NPPs 
will be shut down. With regard to the age of NPPs in the world (Fig. 1), a growth 
in international decommissioning expenses can be expected, too. In 2013, Nukem 
Technologies GmbH estimated, that the international market volume until 2030 could 
sum up to more than Euro 250bn. However, in general, as stated in AREVA’s financial 
report of 2014, the international decommissioning market is only slowly developing 
yet. The available income statements of selected companies active in the German 
decommissioning market show that several of them are still facing losses (Table 2). 
Nevertheless, there are several attempts to reduce costs and thus losses. For 
example, Nukem Technologies expects that a 15–20% decrease in costs of decontam-
Financing Nuclear Decommissioning 159
159
ination and dismantling might be possible (Kutscher 2015). Possible optimisation 
includes the following:
• Portfolio planning: co-ordination of and synergy effects from parallel activities 
at different sites including specialisation and centralisation of specific disman-
tling activities;
• Standardisation and modularisation of decontamination and dismantling 
activities;
• Mobilisation: Mobile equipment for conditioning of nuclear waste;
• Increase in decontamination and in the share of radioactive waste that does not 
have to be stored in a final disposal site but can be used with or without any 
restriction for other purposes if remaining radiation does not exceed specific 
levels, which can be a problem from the nuclear safety perspective if concerns 
and new medical knowledge with regard to risks from low-dose level radiation 
are ignored; 
• Lean management and professional logistics, project management, process 
management, risk management and cost management: reduction in overhead 
costs by concentration of administrative activities, mergers and acquisitions; 
optimised planning and control.
It can be expected that international companies specialising in back-end activities 
like companies of the Russian Rosatom group like Nukem Technologies GmbH 
will be the first benefiting from such developments. This might lead to market con-
centration processes, which will be a challenge for governments aiming at getting 
insight and control of activities with respect to nuclear safety.
8 Comparison of selected decommissioning financing 
concepts
Existing European and international analyses of decommissioning financing 
schemes (Irrek et al., 2007; European Commission 2013; European Commission 
2013a; OECD/NEA, 2016) show that financing schemes in practice substantially 
differ with regard to 
• Cost estimates and accounting procedures;
• Collection and investment of funds;
• How risks and uncertainties have been addressed;
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• Implementation of Polluter Pays Principle;
• Use of funds: Incentives for reducing costs;
• Different degree and ways of public control – differing public information rights.
Table 3 compares the financing schemes in Switzerland, Sweden and Finland from 
which can be particularly learned for future design of decommissioning financing 
concepts. In order to implement the polluter pays principle as far as possible and 
to ensure that governments will be able to control decommissioning activities 
with regard to nuclear safety, the following central questions have to be addressed 
when designing the governance scheme for nuclear decommissioning financing 
(Irrek et al., 2007):
• Who defines or regulates decommissioning (financing)?   
In most cases, this task is assigned to public licensing authorities (government 
level). A key issue thereby is the independence of the authority, which has to 
align different objectives from different stakeholders. Employees of the authority 
should dispose of sufficient personal independence from the operators and, if 
the operators are public entities, from the government.
• Who is liable or who has to pay the decommissioning activities?   
Due to the polluter pays principle assumption, the operators of nuclear installa-
tions should have to carry all decommissioning costs. They should pay through 
a decommissioning funding system, which urges them to financially contribute 
to a designated decommissioning fund. Guarantee schemes like the ones in 
Sweden and Finland aim at ensuring the implementation of the polluter pays 
principle even in case of an early shutdown of the nuclear installation or in case 
of increasing decommissioning costs after the end of operation.
Tab. 3 Comparison of decommissioning financing schemes in Switzerland, Sweden 
and Finland (Däuper at al., 2014; Kaberger/Swahn, 2015; Irrek/Vorfeld, 2015; 
OECD/NEA, 2016; quarterly reports of Swiss funds)
Country Switzerland Finland Sweden
Legal form Two separate public 
law foundations for 
decommissioning 
and radioactive waste 
management.
One single public law 
foundation.





All 5 NPPs and an 
interim storage.
All NPPs with their 
on-site interim storages.
All NPPs.
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Country Switzerland Finland Sweden
Obliged 
party





nagement by an agency 
at an industrial orga-
nization. Board with a 
cost committee and an 
investment committee: 
4 of 9 members of the 
board and 4 of 7 (2 of 7) 
members of the invest-
ment (cost) committee 
are representatives from 
NPP operators. Revisi-
on by certified auditor.
Fund governed by the 
Ministry for Labour 
and Economy.
Operational fund 
management by a state-
owned agency.
Board of Governors and 
Administration, with 









over 50 years of ope-
ration.
Regular installments 
over 25 years of opera-
tion or depending on 
the amount of waste 
produced via a ca. 10% 
surcharge on the elec-
tricity price
Regular installments 
over 40 years of opera-









75% of the fund can be 
borrowed back by the 
NPP operator who has 
to invest it in a produc-
tive way.
25% state bonds.











Operators of nuclear installations hand in bills for decommissioning activi-




External restricted funds (public law foundation) with a specific degree of 
public transparency and control in order to ensure a safe decommissioning.
Economic risk remains with NPP operator, who has additional payment 




Cost estimates probably too low and thus the funds. More realistic cost 
estimates are partly planned but controversially discussed.
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Country Switzerland Finland Sweden
Special di-
sadvantages
Strong influence of NPP 
operators on funds.




tion of NPP operators 




Reform of 2014 foresees 
a 30% surcharge on 
estimated costs to cover 
possible uncertainties.
Joint liability of NPP 
operators in case one of 
them cannot pay.
100% funding gua-
ranteed from start of 
operation.
NPP operators are allo-
wed to borrow back up 
to 75% of funds against 
guarantees.
Up to 10% additional 
guarantee covering cost 
uncertainties can be 





short-fall of funds: 
Guarantee I covering 
the case of early shut 
down and plant-specific 
Guarantee II covering 
cost uncertainties (16-
17% on average).
• Who is the entity, which holds the fund in its general accounts?  
In practice, various solutions are implemented from internal unrestricted to 
external restricted. However, only a restricted fund has the objective to ensure 
that assets will be available when needed to pay for decommissioning activities.
• Who outlines the investment policy and the investment guidelines?  
In general, the prudence principle should be followed in order to ensure that 
sufficient financial means will be available for a safe decommissioning. For this, 
the independence and competence of all involved stakeholders is important. The 
example of Switzerland shows that the strong influence of the NPP operators on 
the fund management can lead to a more risky investment strategy, which, in turn, 
can lead to substantial returns in some years, but also to a substantial decrease 
in asset value in others. The incentive to finance part of future decommissioning 
costs through a high investment performance is evident. A high performance 
on its part can conflict with the prudence principle. However, the professional 
application of asset and liability management allows managing a slightly high-
er risk. Special attention has to be paid to lending practices to related parties 
like in the example of Finland. In particular, lending can be beneficial for the 
NPP operator, but should be backed up by respective guarantees. Furthermore, 
means of finance should be invested in such a way that correlations between 
the investment and the development of the nuclear industry are avoided. It is 
recommended to develop guidelines, which describe the required qualifications 
of investment managers and which give a basic investment policy frame also 
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defining the acceptable risk levels. A kind of oversight board or decommissioning 
financing committee could provide such guidance.
• Who manages the fund?  
A sufficient degree of independence between the operators of nuclear instal-
lations (as polluters and thus contributors to the funds) and the investment 
managers is a key issue.
• Who disposes of the power of authorising payments for decommissioning?  
As mentioned already before, the degree of independence between the operator 
of a nuclear installation as the liable polluter and contributor to the funds, the 
company carrying out decommissioning activities and thus using decommis-
sioning funds, the funds management and the position disposing of the power of 
authorising payments is a key issue in any decommissioning financing system. 
The conflict potential always remains with the entity that has access to the de-
commissioning funds (power of authority). If the NPP operator solely disposes of 
the power of authority (e. g., in internal unrestricted funds), he could be tempted 
to defer payments in periods, where he wishes to use the financial resources for 
other purposes, or where he has general liquidity problems. If the government 
solely disposes of the power of authority and the liable NPP operator has to 
contribute to the fund for any additional costs occurring, the government could 
be tempted to use the financial resources in an inefficient way or for additional 
activities not really needed. 
• Who monitors or controls decommissioning (financing) and who 
has the authority for sanctions in the case of non-compliance?    
Like the definition and regulation of decommissioning financing, this task 
usually is assigned to public licensing authorities on the government level. The 
independence of the authority from the interests of the various stakeholders is 
of vital importance here, too.
9 Conclusions and recommendations
In conclusion, with regard to the financial consequences and risks involved in the 
different nuclear decommissioning financing schemes, existing schemes could be 
improved by (Irrek et al., 2007; OECD/NEA, 2016):
• Measures that establish a system of checks and balances in the governance chain 
in order to avoid negative effects stemming from conflicts of interests;
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• Measures that increase transparency including regularly reviewed, realistic, 
well-founded, published cost estimates. Within this context, a much better 
understanding of the uncertainties affecting decommissioning activities and 
how to best take them into account in cost estimations should be aimed at;
• Measures that set incentives to cost reduction while at the same time maintaining 
the level of radiation protection needed;
• A system of rules for regular contributions to the fund and to cover cases of 
short-falls like the guarantees in the Swedish system in order to ensure the full 
implementation of the polluter pays principle from the first until the last day of 
operation of a nuclear installation and beyond;
• Measures that ensure that fund assets will be separated from other assets and 
liabilities and invested according to the prudence principle so that they are 
available at the appropriate time and used only for their original purpose.
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